


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models:
An Integral Condition
Dominique Demougin¤ and Claude Fluet¤¤y
November 1998
Abstract
We provide an integral condition for the ranking of general information
systems in the agency problem. The condition has a straightforward economic
interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with re-
spect to the agent's e®ort. The proposed criterion is shown to be equivalent to
Kim's MPS condition on the likelihood ratio distributions.
Keywords: Moral Hazard, principal-agent, information systems.
1. Introduction
This note presents an economically intuitive criterion to rank information systems
in standard moral hazard environments. We consider general information systems
and show that from the point of view of an agency all the relevant information can
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be summarized into a performance index. We refer to that index as a mechanism
su±cient statistic. A system is shown to be more e±cient than another if the cumu-
lative of its index is more sensitive to the agent's e®ort. We show that our condition,
hereafter the integral criterion, is equivalent to Kim's (1995) requirement in terms of
mean preserving spreads of the likelihood ratio distributions.
As is well known from existing literature, it is important to distinguish between
the ranking of information systems in general statistical settings and in the agency
framework. Indeed, in one case the problem is to estimate an unobservable parameter
whereas in the second case information is used to design an incentive mechanism at
minimal cost. In a recent paper Kim (1995) has provided a su±cient condition for
ranking information in an agency framework. According to that criterion a system
is more e±cient than another, for the purpose of implementing a given action if the
systems' likelihood ratio distribution can be ordered in terms of mean preserving
spreads (hereafter MPS-criterion). As shown by Kim, this requirement is less restric-
tive than Blackwell's su±ciency condition that has often been used in agency models
(e.g. Gjesdal (1982) or Grossman and Hart (1983)) and it also nests HolmstrÄ om's
(1979) condition in terms of su±cient statistics.
For ease in the development, we ¯nd it initially advantageous to de¯ne the integral
criterion for information structures that are summarized by a su±cient statistic sat-
isfying the monotone likelihood ratio property (hereafter MLRP, see Milgrom (1981)).
In words, the integral condition states that a principal prefers information systems
with a cumulative that is more sensitive to variations in e®ort at the required action
level. Heuristically, a mechanism aligns incentives by equating the agent's marginal
bene¯t to his marginal cost of e®ort. Since marginal bene¯ts can be expressed as
a sum of products where marginals in the cumulative are multiplied by variations
in utility, a cumulative that is more sensitive in e®ort requires smaller variations in
utility in order to align incentives, thereby reducing risk. From the point of view of
the principal, such a reduction is advantageous because it lowers the risk-premium
that must be paid to the agent.
We show that the resulting ordering of information systems is the same as in Kim
(1995) so that our integral condition is equivalent to MPS when the original infor-
mation system satis¯es MLRP. In order to extend the results to general information
systems, we ¯rst derive an aggregation result. Speci¯cally, we show that any infor-
mation system implementing the desired action can be aggregated into a mechanism
su±cient scalar statistic. That statistic is shown to satisfy a local version of MLRP
so that all the foregoing results hold generally.
The remainder of the note is organized as follows. The next section presents
the model. In section 3 we introduce the notion of \more sensitive" information
systems when MLRP holds. We show that it induces a ranking from the point of
view of reducing costs. We use this result to de¯ne the integral condition and deriveRanking of information systems 3
a statistical interpretation. In section 4 we prove the equivalence with the MPS
criterion. In section 5 we extend the criterion and the equivalence result to a general
information setting. The last section o®ers some concluding remarks.
2. The Model
Consider the following principal-agent problem. The principal is risk neutral and her
problem is to induce on the part of the agent an exogenously given level of e®ort
at minimal cost. The agent dislikes e®ort and is risk averse. His preferences are
represented by the separable utility function u(w)¡v(a), where w denotes payment,
a 2 A = [0;a] e®ort and u;v are monotone increasing and respectively concave and
convex functions.
As discussed in the introduction, we initially only consider information systems
that are characterized by a scalar statistic satisfying strict MLRP. Let X be such a
statistic with the family of density functions ff(xja)ga2A and support SX ½ R . We
impose standard regularity requirements, assuming the densitiesto be twice di®eren-
tiable in e®ort, the support to be connected and non-moving in a. The respective
cumulative distributions are denoted by F(xja). Given that MLRP implies ¯rst-order
stochastic dominance, we take as a convention Fa(xja) < 0 for all x and a.1
A contract is made up of an information system and a payment function de¯ned
on the support of that information system. Given the information system X, the
principal who wants to implement b a > 0 solves for the contract that minimizes her
expected costs:
C
P(b a;X) = min
w(x)>k
Z
SX w(x)f(xjb a)dx subject to
(i)
Z
SX u(w(x))f(xjb a)dx ¡ v(b a) > U
(ii)
Z
SX u(w(x))fa(xjb a)dx ¡ v
0(b a) = 0
where U denotes the agent's reservation utility and k is the lower bound on the agent's
payment.2 The constraints are respectively the agent's participation and incentive
compatibility conditions. The incentive constraint has been written presuming the
\¯rst-order approach" to the principal's problem to be valid. As in Kim (1995), this
1Following standard notation Fa(xja) denotes @F
@a (xja).
2As is well known from Mirrlees (1974), requiring a bound on the agent's payment avoids non-
existence problems.Ranking of information systems 4
assumption is maintained throughout.3 The notation CP(b a;X) re°ects the fact that
the principal's cost for implementing b a depends on her information system.
3. Comparing Information Systems
Consider two information systems satisfying the foregoing requirements and repre-
sented by the su±cient statistics X and Y associated with the densities ff(xja)ga2A
and fg(yja)ga2A respectively. Given the cost-minimization objective of the principal,
it is natural to say that an information system is more e±cient than another if it
implements the required action b a at lower expected payments.
De¯nition 1. We say Y is more e±cient than X for implementing a = b a if for any
u, v and k characterizing the principal's problem,
C
P(b a;Y ) 6 C
P(b a;X): (1)
As in the literature, we are looking for a ranking criterion based only on the statis-
tics' distributions. An initial di±culty in attempting to rank information systems is
that the distributions of their respective su±cient statistics are not necessarily di-
rectly comparable; for example they need not have the same range. Our ¯rst step
is therefore to provide a transformation of the initial information systems which we
argue creates a useful standardization.
Proposition 2. Let X be a su±cient statistic for an information system satisfying
the assumptions of the model. De¯ne the random variable Z as
Z = F(Xjb a); (2)
then
1. Z is a su±cient statistic of the initial information system, with support SZ =
[0;1];
2. its family of densities fhX(zja)ga2A is such that hX(zjb a) = 1 for all z 2 [0;1];
3. Z satis¯es strict MLRP and, for all a 2 A, the cumulative distributions HX(zja)
satisfy HX
a (zja) < 0 for all z 2 (0;1).
Proof. Given that X satis¯es the assumption of the model, we have:
3Given that X satis¯es MLRP, a su±cient condition would be to impose CDFP (see Rogerson
(1985)). For other su±cient conditions, see Jewitt (1988).Ranking of information systems 5
1. X is a su±cient statistic with positive density, thus the transformation Z =
F(Xjb a) is strictly increasing. Therefore Z is also a su±cient statistic with
support SZ de¯ned by the range of the cumulative F which is the unit interval.
2. Let HX(zja) denote the cumulative of Z given that the agent undertakes e®ort
a. Then
H
X(zja) ´ PrfF(Xjb a) 6 z j ag
= PrfX 6 F
¡1(zjb a) j ag
= F[F
¡1(zjb a)ja]
where F ¡1 denotes the inverse with respect to x; x 2 SX. The inverse exists
since F is strictly increasing in x. Now at a = b a we have by construction the
identity F[F¡1(zjb a)jb a] = z which proves the claim.






























(zjb a) > 0 :
Strict MLRP further implies strict ¯rst-order stochastic dominance. Therefore,
given the convention Fa(xja) < 0; it yields HX
a (zja) < 0 for all a 2 A and
z 2 (0;1).
Henceforth, Z is referred to as the information system's standardized statistic.
From part 2 in the proposition, we observe that the standardized statistics of di®erent
information systems have the same uniform distribution when the agent undertakes
the required e®ort b a. Of course, the distributions will di®er for other e®ort levels a 6=
b a. This suggests that, for the purpose of implementing b a, information systems could
potentially be ranked in terms of the sensitivity of their standardized distributions
with respect to e®ort at a = b a.Ranking of information systems 6
De¯nition 3. An information system Y is more sensitive than X at a = b a if
8z 2 [0;1]; ¡H
X
a (zjb a) 6 ¡H
Y
a (zjb a) (3)
Since for any information system the standardized statistic designed to implement
b a satis¯es H(zjb a) = z, it should be obvious that (3) is equivalent to a more conven-
tional de¯nition of sensitivity in terms of elasticities. Because the condition must
hold at all z, it is also evident that it can only generate a partial ordering of infor-
mation systems. Two information systems ordered by (3) are represented in ¯gure 1.
It should be noted that the concavity of the curves follows directly from MLRP.4
To see why the foregoing de¯nition might be relevant, consider any increasing
payment schedule w(z), z 2 [0;1]. Given a standardized information system, such
a schedule de¯nes a contract. Now let us consider two information systems, X and
Y , and their respective standardized statistics. From proposition 2, we know that, if
the agent were to actually undertake the e®ort b a, both standardized statistics would
be uniformly distributed on the unit interval. The agent's expected utility would
therefore be the same under either information structure. However, this would in
general not be true for other e®ort levels.
0 z
1
-H   (z|â) a
X
-H   (z|â) a
X
-H   (z|â) a
Y
Figure 1: Sensitivity of information systems at a = b a
Now, let us assume that Y is more sensitive than X at b a. A small increase in
e®ort from b a to say b a+" means that HY (zjb a+") dominates HX(zjb a+") in the sense
of ¯rst-order stochastic dominance. As a consequence, for the same schedule w(z),
the agent would be strictly better o® under Y than under X should he undertake the
e®ort b a+". This suggests that a more sensitive information system provides stronger
incentives. The next lemma provides a formal proof of this intuition.
4The result follows from
R 1
0 ha(zjb a)dz = 0 and from strict MLRP which implies because of the
uniform distribution result d
dz[ha(zjb a)] > 0:Ranking of information systems 7
Lemma 4. Let w(z); z 2 [0;1] be the optimal payment schedule implementing b a





a (zjb a)dz ¡ v
0(b a) > 0 (4)































a (zjb a)dz ¡ v
0(b a)
where the second and the fourth equality follow from integration by part { with
HX
a (0jb a) = HX
a (1jb a) = HY
a (0jb a) = HY
a (1jb a) = 0) { and the inequality from de¯nition
3 and the fact that w0(z) > 0 by MLRP.
The actual derivation of the proof shows that the agent's marginal bene¯t can be







A more sensitive information system increases the second term of the product, thus
raising the agent's incentives. In the next proposition, we show that the principal
is able to use this observation to her advantage. By reducing the ¯rst term of the
product she can maintain e®ort incentives at b a. However, diminishing that term also
reduces risk which lowers the premium required to satisfy the agent's participation
constraint, thereby also decreasing the principal's expected cost.
Proposition 5. Assume Y is more sensitive than X at a = b a, then Y is more e±cient
than X at a = b a:
Proof. We show CP(b a;Y ) 6 CP(b a;X). Let w(z); z 2 [0;1] be the optimal
payment schedule implementing b a under the information system X. From the lemma








a (zjb a)dz ¡ v
0(b a)Ranking of information systems 8








a (zjb a)dz ¡ v
0(b a) (5)
Consequently, for any pair (z0;z1) satisfying (5) we can implement b a under the infor-





w(z0) z 6 z0
w(z) z0 < z < z1
w(z1) z > z1





Y(zjb a)dz ¡ v(b a) ¡U :
Finally, let ¼ be the agent's rent under the initial contract with information system X.
Keeping in mind hY (zjb a) = hX(zjb a) = 1;note that (5) can be satis¯ed by z1 = 1 which
implies b w(zjz0;1). Similarly, it can be satis¯ed by z0 = 0 which implies b w(zj0;z1).
Now,
b w(zjz0;1) > w(z) =) b ¼(z0;1) > ¼
b w(zj0;z1) 6 w(z) =) b ¼(0;z1) 6 ¼ :
Hence by continuity there exists a pair (z¤
0;z¤
1) such that the agent undertakes the
required e®ort and earns the same rent as under the initial contract (note that if
¼ > 0 the principal might be able to further reduce the rent). However, by Jensen's
inequality, for a = b a the expected value of b w(zjz¤
0;z¤
1) is less than that of w(z). Thus
the principal's cost under the contract b w(zjz¤
0;z¤
1) with information system Y is less
than CP(b a;X).
The above results are easily transposed in terms of the original random variables
X and Y . The standardized statistics were de¯ned in such a way that events of
the form Z 6 z have the same probability under X and under Y when the agent
undertakes the required e®ort b a. De¯nition 3 introduces a notion of more sensitive
with respect to such equiprobable events. In terms of the original statistics, such
events are of the form X 6 x and Y 6 y. Hence de¯nition 3 and proposition 5 imply
the following criterion:
Integral Criterion. Let X and Y be two information systems with cumulative
distributions F(xja) and G(yja); respectively. Then Y is more e±cient than X for
implementing b a if, for all realizations y and x such that G(yjb a) = F(xjb a), we have
¡Ga(y; b a) > ¡Fa(xjb a): (6)Ranking of information systems 9
Observe that as with standardized statistics this de¯nition could equivalently be
written in terms of the elasticities of the respective cdf's. The above criterion ranks
information systems for the purpose of implementing b a. It should be obvious that the
comparison can be extended by requiring (6) to hold over the entire agent's action
space.
To conclude the section, we now suggest a simple statistical interpretation of the
integral criterion. Consider a test between the following hypotheses:
H0 : a = b a
H1 : a = b a ¡ "
where " is a small positive number. For the purpose of such a test, an information
system Y would be unambiguously better than an other system X if, for any level
of type I error, it allows for a smaller type II error. In the de¯nition of the integral
criterion the type I error is given by G(yjb a) = F(xjb a) whereas the type II errors are
given by 1¡G(yjb a¡") and 1¡F(xjb a¡").5 Therefore, applying a Taylor expansion
for small ", the integral condition immediately implies that a statistician would prefer
an information system Y to X.
4. An equivalence result under MLRP
In this section, we relate the integral criterion to a recent condition introduced by Kim
(1995). The latter condition ranks information systems in terms of a mean preserving
spread of the likelihood ratio distributions. For completeness, we now restate Kim's
result:
MPS Criterion. Let X and Y be two information systems with respective families
of densities ff(xja)ga2A and fg(yja)ga2A. Then Y is more e±cient than X for imple-
menting a = b a if the random variable
ga(Y jb a)
g(Y jb a) is a mean preserving spread of
fa(Xjb a)
f(Xjb a) .
The MPS criterion is useful because it is less restrictive than Blackwell's (1951,
1953) well-known su±ciency condition for the ranking of information systems in a
general decision-making framework. As emphasized by Kim (1995, p. 98), it is less
restrictive because \the e±ciency of an information system in the agency model is
basically unrelated to the degree of statistical inference about the hidden agent's
choice but is related to the degree of control over the agent's choice".
With respect to the agency problem, the other well known criterion is HolmstrÄ om's
(1979) informativeness condition. The main weakness of the latter is that it can only
compare systems with an inclusive relationship, in the sense that one system has more
signals than the other. Kim (1995) further shows that the MPS criterion nests the
5Indeed, given MLRP, we know from the Neyman-Pearson Lemma that the e±cient critical
regions for H0 are of the form X 6 x and Y 6 y.Ranking of information systems 10
informativeness condition in that, if one system is more informative in the sense of
HolmstrÄ om (1979), it satis¯es the MPS criterion. However, the latter remains more
general because it can also rank non inclusive information systems.
In what follows, we ¯rst show that the integral condition is equivalent to the
MPS criterion when the information systems satisfy strict MLRP. We start with a
useful result relative to the likelihood ratio distributions of the standardized statistics
de¯ned by equation (2).
Lemma 6. Let Z be the standardized statistic at b a of an information system X









a (1jb a)); L




where the inverse is taken with respect to z 2 [0;1]:
Proof. Since hX(zjb a) = 1, we have:
L






















where the ¯rst and the last equality follows from the uniform distribution of Z at
a = b a. The second step follows by strict MLRP so that the inverse exists.
In ¯gure 2 we represent the likelihood ratio distributions for the standardized
statistics of two information systems X and Y . Geometrically, the MPS criterion
states that Y dominates X at b a if for all r along the horizontal axis the area under
the curve LY is never smaller than that under LX. This refers to the area between
the two curves as obtained by vertical integration. By contrast, the integral criterion
states that Y dominates X at b a if for all z along the vertical axis the area between
that axis and the curve LY is never smaller than that with respect to LX. This
corresponds again to the area between the two curves as obtained, however, through
horizontal integration. Applying this observation, it is now straightforward to show










Figure 2: Likelihood ratio distribution functions
Proposition 7. Let X and Y be two information systems satisfying strict MLRP.
Then Y dominates X for implementing b a according to the MPS criterion if and only
if the same also holds according to the integral criterion.
Proof. From the de¯nition of stochastic dominance (see Rothschild and Stiglitz










Y(qjb a) ¡ L
X(qjb a)]dq > 0
and T(hY
a (1jb a)) = 0.
From equation (3) the integral criterion is de¯ned by:





a (sjb a) ¡ h
X
a (sjb a)]ds 6 0
where S(1) = 0.
We only show that the MPS criterion implies the integral criterion; the proof of
the converse is perfectly symmetrical and is left to the reader.
Assume the MPS criterion holds and denote with SLY the support of LY. It
follows that the support of LX must be contained in SLY as is represented in ¯gure
2. Let E denote the set of intersection points, i.e. E is the set of pairs (ri;zi) that
satisfy the equality
L
X(rijb a) = L
Y(rijb a) = zi; ri 2 S
LY
:Ranking of information systems 12
As is obvious from the ¯gure, for all the intersection points T(ri) = ¡S(zi): Hence
T(ri) > 0 implies S(zi) 6 0. Now consider any z 2 (zi;zi+1). As can also been seen
from the ¯gure hY
a (¢jb a)¡hX
a (¢jb a) is either positive over the entire interval or negative
over the interval. If it is negative, we write





a (sjb a) ¡ h
X
a (sjb a)]ds 6 0:
If on the contrary it is positive, then we write:





a (sjb a) ¡ h
X
a (sjb a)]ds 6 0:
To conclude this section, suppose X and Y are interpreted as performance indexes
corresponding to two information systems. When is one index more e±cient than the
other to implement some given e®ort level? Applying Kim's MPS condition, a test
would be to verify whether the likelihood ratio of one index is a mean preserving
spread of the other. Applying the integral criterion, a perfectly equivalent test would
be to verify if the cdf of one index is more sensitive than the other. Both tests are
undertaken for the required e®ort level.
5. The general case
In the foregoing sections, the information systems were de¯ned by scalar random
variables satisfying strict MLRP. We now extend the results to general information
systems. For this purpose, note that the strict MLRP assumption, though su±cient,
was never necessary for any of the proofs. Instead, what was required was only a
local version of strict MLRP by which we mean that the likelihood ratio be strictly
increasing around b a. This property was used numerous times: in proposition 2 when
we invert the cumulative; in ¯gure 1 to guarantee that the curves were concave; in
the statistical interpretation of the integral criterion; in the proof of lemma 6 and the
ensuing equivalence result. We now argue that this is not a restrictive requirement.
Let the information system be given by the random vector - with support S- µ
R n and density functions fÁ(!ja)ga2A. Denote the respective cumulatives by ©(!ja).
As previously, we assume standard regularity requirements for the densities and the
support. To derive the desired result, we proceed in two steps. First, we introduce
the concept of a mechanism su±cient statistic, i.e. a statistic which aggregates all
relevant information from the principal's point of view. Second, we show there exists a
scalar mechanism su±cient statistic implementing b a which has the required property
of local MLRP.Ranking of information systems 13
De¯nition 8. A statistic X(-) is mechanism su±cient for b a if for any u, v and k
characterizing the principal's problem, the resulting cost-minimizing payment func-
tion w(!) can be written as:
8! 2 S
-; w(!) = b w[X(!)]
Clearly from the de¯nition a principal wanting to implement e®ort b a can do so
as well by observing X and using the payment function b w as by conditioning the
payment w on the original information system -: It should be noted that mechanism
su±ciency as de¯ned above does not imply statistical su±ciency in the usual sense.
For an illustration of this distinction, see Demougin and Fluet (1998) who analyze
the limiting case of risk-neutral participants.




; ! 2 S
-
with density functions ff(xja)ga2A. Then, assuming the ¯rst-order approach is valid,




f(xjb a) ] > 0.
Proof. First, we show that X is mechanism su±cient. As is well known from




= ¹ + ¸
Áa(!jb a)
Á(!jb a)
= ¹ + ¸X(!)
where ¹, ¸ are positive multipliers for the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints respectively.6 Clearly the above de¯nition applies and X is a mechanism




6Implicitly, we have assumed that the limited liability constraint w(!) > k is never binding. If it
is binding then w(!) = k for X(!) less than or equal to some critical value. As is obvious this does
not change the result.Ranking of information systems 14

























Fa(x + "jb a) ¡ Fa(xjb a)




























And therefore, at b a the random variable X satis¯es a local version of MLRP.
One way to interpret this result is to say that any information system implement-
ing a required e®ort can be aggregated into a one-dimensional performance index.
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that a mechanism su±cient statistic
is unique only up to a strict monotonic transformation. Since any information system
for which the ¯rst-order approach is valid can be represented by a performance index
satisfying a local version of MLRP at b a, all the results from the foregoing sections
apply. In particular, the equivalence between the MPS and the integral criteria holds
generally. To conclude, we give a generalized version of the integral criterion.
Generalized Integral Criterion: Let -i be an information system implementing
b a, i = 1;2 with Xi a mechanism su±cient scalar statistic. Then -1 is more e±cient









This note introduces a criterion for ranking information systems in terms of cdf's.
Assuming the ¯rst-order approach, we show that any information system can beRanking of information systems 15
aggregated in a unidimensional performance index satisfying a local version of MLRP.
That result is used to prove that one information system is more e±cient than another
if its performance index has a more sensitive cdf.
That criterion is shown to be equivalent to Kim's (1995) MPS condition. The
equivalence allows for an intuitive interpretation of Kim's condition in terms of the
integral criterion. Accordingly, if an information systemis more e±cient than another,
it is because the principal can substitute variations in the probability of payments
for variations in the amount of payments, thereby reducing the agent's risk.
References
Blackwell, D. (1951): \Comparison of experiments", in: Proceedings of the Second
Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, Ed. by J. Neyman.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Blackwell, D. (1953): \Equivalent comparison of experiments", Annals of Mathe-
matics and Statistics, 24:265-272.
Demougin, D. and C. Fluet (1998): \Mechanism su±cient statistic in the risk-
neutral agency problem", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154(4):
622-639.
Gjesdal, J. (1982): \Information and incentives: the agency information problem",
Review of Economic Studies, 49:373-390.
Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1983): \An analysis of the principal-agent problem",
Econometrica, 51:7-45.
HolmstrÄ om, B. (1979): \Moral hazard and observability", Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, 10:74-91.
Jewitt, I. (1988): \Justifying the ¯rst-order approach to principal-agent prob-
lems", Econometrica, 56:1177-1190.
Kim, S.K. (1995): \E±ciency of an information system in an agency model",
Econometrica, 63:89-102.
Milgrom P. (1981): \Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and
applications", Bell Journal of Economics, 12:380-391.
Mirrlees, J. (1974): \Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty",
in: Essays in Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty, Ed. by M. Balch, D. McFadden
and S. Wu. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 243-258.
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz (1970): \Increasing risk I: A de¯nition", Journal of
Economic Theory, 2:225-243.
Rogerson, W. (1985): \The ¯rst-order approach to principal-agent problems",
Econometrica, 53:1357-1367.